PopulationTheGuide

Europe's population decline: what the 2024 data shows

Eurostat's 2024 demographic report confirmed what had been building for a decade: natural population decline — more deaths than births — is now the norm across Southern and Eastern Europe. With a historic-low EU average TFR of 1.46 and accelerating ageing, the continent faces a structural demographic challenge that immigration can moderate but not reverse.

1.46EU average TFR (2023 historic low)
1.08Malta TFR (EU lowest, 2023)
−20%Bulgaria projected pop. loss by 2050
715 MEurope projected pop. 2050 (UN)

Natural decline: the data

Eurostat publishes annual demographic balances for each EU member state. The 2024 data covering 2023 shows that more deaths than births were recorded in Italy, Greece, Portugal, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Serbia. The natural increase rate was negative in these countries — meaning that without immigration, their populations would have shrunk purely from vital statistics.

The pattern is sharpest in Eastern Europe. Bulgaria's natural increase rate is approximately −6 per 1,000 — comparable to the most extreme ageing countries in the world. Latvia and Lithuania are similar. In these countries, the problem compounds because net migration is also negative — young, educated citizens emigrate to Western Europe, leaving an older residual population with even lower fertility and higher mortality.

The EU TFR at a historic low

The EU average TFR of 1.46 in 2023 was the lowest recorded since Eurostat began systematic tracking. It was a central theme at the European Population Conference 2024 in Edinburgh, where researchers argued the figure is unlikely to recover to levels seen in the 1990s–2000s. The policy environment has changed: housing costs have risen sharply across Western Europe, childcare gaps persist, and younger cohorts report later partnership formation.

The variation within Europe remains enormous. France (1.68), Sweden (1.45), and Ireland (1.70) are at the higher end. Spain (1.16), Italy (1.20), and Malta (1.08) are at the lower end. The OECD Family Database attributes part of the North–South gap to differences in formal childcare availability, parental leave generosity, and housing affordability.

Can immigration fill the gap?

For Western and Northern European countries — Germany, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, UK — immigration has so far more than offset natural decline, producing positive total population change. Germany's net migration of 600,000–700,000 per year has kept its population above 84 million despite a TFR of 1.5. This is the demographic logic behind the concept of replacement migration — the idea that immigration can substitute for missing births.

But replacement migration has limits. The UN's original 2001 study showed that maintaining working-age populations at stable levels would require migration flows 3–4× historical levels — politically and logistically challenging. And for Eastern European countries already experiencing net emigration, the pool of potential migrants willing to relocate there is limited. The World Bank Europe & Central Asia team has flagged Eastern European demographic decline as one of the region's most significant long-run economic risks.

Pension and labour market implications

The old-age dependency ratio — people aged 65+ per 100 working-age adults — is projected by Eurostat to rise from roughly 32 in 2023 to 57 by 2070 across the EU. This is the ratio that determines pension sustainability: as it rises, either contribution rates must increase, benefit levels must fall, retirement ages must rise, or some combination of all three.

The OECD Pensions Outlook consistently identifies Eastern and Southern Europe as at highest risk of pension system strain, given the combination of low fertility, emigration, and relatively early legal retirement ages. Greece, Italy, and France have all faced political crises over pension reform attempts. The European Economic and Social Committee has called for pan-European demographic strategies that go beyond purely national-level pension reform to include coordinated family policy, affordable housing programmes, and managed migration.

Frequently asked questions

Is Europe's population actually declining?

Europe's total population is still growing slightly due to immigration, but natural change — births minus deaths — is negative across most of Southern and Eastern Europe. Countries including Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Romania all record more deaths than births. See Eurostat demographic data for current figures.

Which European country has the lowest fertility rate?

Within the EU, Malta recorded the lowest TFR at approximately 1.08 in 2023, followed by Spain (1.16) and Italy (1.20). The EU average hit a historic low of 1.46. South Korea (0.72) holds the global record. The OECD Family Database tracks these figures annually.

Can immigration offset Europe's natural population decline?

Partially. Western European countries like Germany and France offset natural decline through net migration. But Eastern European countries facing both natural decline AND net emigration have limited ability to attract offsetting inflows. See our glossary on replacement migration for the full analysis.

What will Europe's population be in 2050?

UN WPP 2024 projects Europe's population (including Russia) at roughly 715 million by 2050, down from ~745 million today. Bulgaria could lose ~20% of its population; Latvia and Lithuania 15–18%. The EU27 as a whole will decline more modestly due to continued immigration from outside Europe.